Recent research on ultimatum bargaining, the fact that children often confront and use ultimatums, and theories of developmental psychology all combine to suggest that studying children's ultimatum behavior will be particularly enlightening, both theoretically and with respect to the development of bargaining behavior. The results from two experiments indicate that younger children made larger oers and accepted smaller oers than older participants. Boys took greater strategic advantage of asymmetric information than girls; this dichotomy began with nine-year-olds (third graders) and continued for twelve-and ®fteen-year-olds (sixth and ninth graders) as well as for college students. Like adults, children accepted smaller oers when they did not know how much was being divided. Older children required increasingly higher oers, except for college students who were willing to accept considerably less than others. Also, some of the nine-year-olds displayed an extremely strong sense of fairness. The discussion focuses on the development of bargaining strategies and concerns for fairness. Ó
Introduction
Fairness and exchange are typical aspects of everyday interpersonal interaction. When encounters intensify and become de®ned as negotiations, ultimatums become a possible (and sometimes probable) end-game strategy. Recent empirical work in experimental economics has focused considerable attention on the dynamics of ultimatum bargaining; results suggest that a forceful economic prediction derived from models of subgame-perfect equilibria (Selten, 1965) cannot explain a remarkably consistent set of ®ndings. Instead, concerns for fairness are often suggested as an explanation for the results (e.g., Gu È th and Tietz, 1990) .
Although issues surrounding fairness have a long history (e.g., see Plato's Republic), we are not aware of any literature that documents a seemingly fundamental question about fairness and bargaining, that is, how children incorporate issues of fairness in their negotiations. Given anecdotal evidence that young children commonly experience ultimatums and other threats (from their parents, siblings, and peers; Murnighan, 1991) , ultimatums appear to be a natural bargaining task for studying age-related behaviors in negotiations. In addition, the literature on the development of fairness concerns can be applied directly to these issues.
Thus, this paper presents a ®rst attempt to study the ultimatum bargaining strategies of both children and adults and represents, in part, a reaction to the surprising absence in the empirical research literature on children's bargaining behaviors and the development of bargaining strategies. This study is an attempt to understand one important area ± bargaining ± of``the economic world that children are constructing themselves'' (Lea et al., 1987, p. 398) . It also takes an approach that addresses how children understand and try to solve economic problems (Webley and Lea, 1993, p. 463) . As a ®rst step in this endeavor, we combine models of children's perceptions of distributive justice (e.g., Damon, 1980 ) with theories of rational choice to generate hypotheses about children's and adults' ultimatum bargaining behavior. Fairness and income maximization provide markedly dierent outlooks on this most basic of bargaining interactions. Speci®cally, this paper focuses on the formation and resolution of ultimatums by kindergartners (5-and 6-year-olds), third graders (9-year-olds), sixth graders (12-year-olds), ninth graders (15-yearolds), and third year college students (20-to 22-year-olds), as framed by economic, social psychological, and developmental theories of fairness and negotiation.
Ultimatums
By boiling a negotiation down to its most basic, ®nal event, an ultimatum represents the essence of the endgame in competitive two-party bargaining. In its barest form, as studied here, an ultimatum represents the simplest of negotiations: one person makes an oer; the other can accept it or reject it. An acceptance seals the deal, in the terms proposed by the oerer. A rejection means that both parties receive nothing from the interaction. Unlike many real world negotiations, experiments on ultimatums have generally not allowed ®nal oers to be changed: they are true ultimatums.
Models of subgame-perfect equilibria (Selten, 1965; Stahl, 1972) predict that people will accept any ultimatum oer that is greater than zero (i.e., something is better than nothing). Working backward from the respondent's choices (which in this case are restricted to simply accepting or rejecting an oer) suggests that oerers need not oer much, since rejecting would give respondents a zero payo. The theory fails to predict the often-repeated observations that (1) people oer more than small amounts (often as much as half) and (2) many people reject oers that are greater than zero (e.g., Roth et al., 1991) .
Indeed, the subgame-perfect model's predictions and experimental observations show little relationship to one another in typical ultimatum games (e.g., Ochs and Roth, 1989; Roth, 1995) . Adults' oers, in a variety of studies, settings, and countries (e.g., Gu È th et al., 1982; Gu È th and Tietz, 1987; Neelin et al., 1988; Ochs and Roth, 1989; Roth et al., 1991) have averaged between 40% and 50% of the amount to be divided ± much larger than predicted. Reasons proposed for unpredicted large oers have focused on oerers' concerns for fairness (Straub and Murnighan, 1995) or their expectations that respondents may reject small oers (Harrison and McCabe, 1992) . Reasons proposed for the unpredicted rejections of small oers have included that: (a) respondents may require some minimum oer, below which they will reject everything (Ochs and Roth, 1989) ; (b) respondents' concerns for fairness lead them to resist small, unfair oers (Gu È th and Tietz, 1990) ; or (c) small oers wound a respondent's pride and generate spiteful rejections (Straub and Murnighan, 1995) . Straub and Murnighan (1995) addressed several of these issues in two experiments which included standard conditions of complete information, where both oerers and respondents knew how much was being divided, and partial information conditions, where respondents did not know how much was being divided. Results indicated that, as before, many respondents who knew how much was being divided rejected small oers. Respondents who did not know how much was being divided, however, accepted and were willing to accept much smaller oers (as they have in studies by Kagel et al., 1992, and Croson, 1993) , indicating that they did not have some minimally acceptable oer. In fact, people reported being willing to accept such small oers (if oerers would make them) that the subgame-perfect predictions for respondents were ®nally supported, but only in the partial information conditions.
Oers, however, consistently exceeded predictions in both the complete and partial information conditions. In fact, most participants oered signi®cantly more in the complete information conditions than they did in the partial information conditions: they took advantage of respondents' lack of information and shaded their oers (oering less) when respondents did not know how much they were dividing. Straub and Murnighan (1995) operationally de®ned this behavior as strategic rather than fair (which was operationally de®ned as oering the same amount in both information conditions), suggesting, as have other studies (e.g., Harrison and McCabe, 1992; Kahn and Murnighan, 1993) , that people raise their oers to avoid potential rejections rather than to be fair to respondents. Recent research (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1995 ) extends this conclusion, showing that oerers are exploitative as well as strategic, since they reduced the size of their oers when they could add`T his is fair'' labels to them before submitting them to respondents.
Children's approaches to fairness
The research related to children's bargaining has focused primarily on children's allocation norms (e.g., Streater and Chertko, 1976) or their competitiveness in matrix games (e.g., Toda et al., 1978) . Studies of the development of expressions of self-interest and fairness have repeatedly relied on a procedure derived from the study of equity models in adults (e.g., Adams, 1963) . After two children performed a task, one of them divided a reward. Most designs incorporated false feedback that one child's performance was either equal to or better than the other's. Since this information was provided to both children, it established a basis for dierential perceptions of deservingness and dierent allocation norms. Researchers then categorized actual allocations as re¯ecting norms of equality, equity (i.e., outcomes that were proportional to performance dierences), or some combination of the two (e.g., ordinal equity, where the better performer got more, but not proportionally more, than the poorer performer). Lerner (1974) used a method that avoided the allocator's inherent con¯ict between self-interest and the preferred allocation norm. His``third party'' procedure asked child allocators to divide the payo between two other children with known performance achievements. A ®nal variation (Morgan and Sawyer, 1967; Streater and Chertko, 1976 ) allowed performers to actually negotiate their allocations face-to-face.
The results are consistent with the early stages of the six stage model of moral development by Kohlberg (1976) , where children progress from selfinterested rule following to understanding that others have needs to conforming to the Golden Rule. In all three methodological variations, the ®ndings show that younger children are own-gain oriented (e.g., Keil, 1986; McClintock et al., 1977) . Wide disparities in performance often led to allocations based on ordinal equity, which gives more to the better performer, but not enough to match the dierential performance ratio (Keil and McClintock, 1983) . In addition, fair allocations (proportional or ordinal equity or equality) by self-interested allocators increased with age (e.g., van Avermaet and McClintock, 1988) .
The model of social reasoning by Damon (1980) also re¯ects these ®ndings, with children (a) being primarily self-interested prior to ®ve years of age, (b) focusing on equality as a way to prevent con¯ict from 5 to 7 years of age, and (c) beginning to think in terms of equity thereafter. In contrast to these predictions, Handlon and Gross (1959) found that kindergartners (5-and 6-yearolds) were much more likely to keep a majority of the prize than 4th, 5th, or 6th graders (10-to 12-year-olds), who were most likely to split it equally. Hook and Cook (1979) suggested that children's increasing use of proportional equity matches increases in their ability to calculate and apply proportionality.
Research also shows that children become increasingly competitive with age across several cultural groups (e.g., Kagan and Madsen, 1972; Toda et al., 1978) . Taken together, these results revise the early observations of Piaget (1965) : not only may concerns for equality peak early, but concerns for and the ability to calculate equity, along with competitive behavior, appear to increase with age.
In the ultimatum bargaining task, however, oerers have no substantive claim for their more powerful position: they have really done nothing to achieve their role as oerer. Thus, equity concerns in the context of ultimatums may be conceptualized as equality.
Operationally, our research follows Straub and Murnighan (1995) and de®nes 50±50 oers as perfectly fair. The developmental literature we have reviewed suggests that perfectly fair, equal oers will be most likely for younger children, especially kindergartners, as they ®t Damon's 5-to 7-yearold category where pushes for equality are strongest. As children get older, their ability to calculate proportionality may also lead to a departure from equality. This depends on whether they acclimate quickly to the role (and the power) of the oerer, as adults seem to do. Thus, we predict that perfect fairness will be most frequent for the youngest children in our studies and tentatively predict that strategic behavior will increase with age. Hypothesis 1. Younger children will make more equal, 50±50 oers than older children.
Hypothesis 2. Older children will be increasingly strategic as oerers. That is, older oerers will shade (reduce) their oers more and more frequently when respondents do not know how much is being divided.
Previous research on generosity, however, suggests that children become more generous as they get older (e.g., Zarbatany et al., 1985) and that girls are more generous than boys. Thus, if children view the oerer's role as an opportunity to be generous, they may oer more. This provides a contrasting hypothesis and a gender-based hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1a. Older children will make larger, more generous oers than younger children. Hypothesis 3. Girls will make larger ultimatum oers than boys.
Finally, with respect to their behavior as respondents, a wealth of research (e.g., Mischel and Metzner, 1962) suggests that younger children have a much harder time delaying or refusing grati®cation than older children. Thus, Hypothesis 4. Younger children will accept smaller oers than older children.
Previous results for adults showed that they accepted less as respondents when they did not know how much was being divided. There seems to be little reason for predicting dierent results across dierent age groups. Thus, the ®nal hypothesis is a replication prediction.
Hypothesis 5. Respondents will accept smaller oers when they do not know how much is being divided than they will when they do know how much is being divided. This paper reports the results of two related studies. Study 1 includes children who were enrolled in kindergarten (5-and 6-year-olds), third grade (9-year-olds), and sixth grade (12-year-olds). Unlike previous studies with adults, who could make repeated ultimatum oers and responses in a questionnaire, younger children needed individual instructions to understand and respond to the task. Study 2 used more standard methods and includes sixth and ninth graders (15-year-olds); results from college students reported by Straub and Murnighan (1995) were included for comparison. Sixth graders were included in both studies to provide a basis of comparison between the two experiments.
Study 1
2.1. Methods
Participants
Forty-seven children in two kindergarten classes and 40 children in two third grade classes at an elementary school in Champaign, Illinois, and 35 children in the sixth grade classes from the junior high school in Mahomet, Illinois participated in this experiment. Champaign is a university town of about 65,000 people; Mahomet is a rural suburb of Champaign. The kindergartners and third graders represented a mix of racial and socioeconomic backgrounds; sixth graders were primarily Caucasian from a mix of rural and suburban homes.
Procedures and design
We used a face-to-face, one-on-one procedure to ensure that the children would understand the task. Three experimenters (the authors and a female associate) asked each child to make a series of choices in the hallway outside their school classroom. Each child made take-it-or-leave-it oers of money and M&Ms (small, sugar-coated chocolate candies that are popular among American children) and responded to another unidenti®ed child's take-it-orleave-it oers of money and M&Ms. Half of the participants made oers ®rst; half responded to oers ®rst. As respondents, children were told to imagine another child who had an amount of money (unspeci®ed or $1) or a number of M&Ms (unspeci®ed or 10). This other child had to oer them some of it.
If they accepted, they were to imagine that they would receive what they were oered and the other child would get what was left. If they rejected the oer, they were to imagine that they received nothing and the other child also received nothing.
In the partial information conditions (which always preceded comparable complete information conditions), they were told that they would not know how much the other child was dividing. The experimenter sequentially displayed oers of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 25, and 50 cents, in that order, or from 1 to 10 M&Ms, one at a time, on the table in front of them, and asked whether they would accept or reject each oer. Participants always responded to coin oers before M&M oers since pilot testing suggested that the appearance of M&Ms prior to coins seriously impeded younger children's ability to concentrate when they were asked to switch to coins. Oers were discontinued when they had accepted three consecutively.
Prior to implementing the experimental procedures, the experimenters asked kindergartners and third graders whether they could identify and dierentiate dierent coins. All of the third graders knew the dierences between and the values of a penny, nickel, dime, and quarter (respectively 1, 5, 10 and 25 cents). Kindergartners understood the value of a penny, but often confused the remaining coins. Thus, the results for kindergartners' coin oers were not included in the quantitative analyses; we use their choices for coins only in our description of the qualitative ®ndings.
As oerers in the face-to-face procedure, children formulated ultimatums dividing money ®rst and M&Ms second. They made partial information oers, dividing $1 (2 quarters, 2 dimes, 4 nickels, and 10 pennies), before dividing 4, 5, 10, and 11 M&Ms (small and large amounts of an even and an odd number of M&Ms), before making complete information oers using the same amounts. During the experiment, the complete or partial information nature of the situation was frequently reemphasized. The experimenters often asked children why they had chosen a particular action. All interactions were tape recorded.
The design included a number of factors, including grades (kindergarten, 3rd, and 6th), gender, information (complete and partial), amounts for M&M oers (4, 5, 10, and 11), order (oers or responses ®rst), and experimenters. For monetary oers, the design included only two grade levels (3rd and 6th grades); kindergartners were excluded from these analyses. For M&M oers, all three grades and four amounts were included in the design. Analysis of responses to oers included all three grades as well as gender and information. Order and experimenters were included in preliminary analyses to test for potentially biasing eects.
Teachers and administrators at the schools required that the children not be provided any direct compensation (i.e., either money or M&Ms); they received no money or candy as a result of their oers or responses. Although this was not as desirable as providing them with real outcomes, the children responded with considerable interest and involvement in the task. Also, although debate about the value of tangible incentives continues (Roth, 1995) , Thaler (1987) reviewed several studies showing no dierences in eects for real and hypothetical payments and concluded that experiments that did not include ®nancial incentives still provided important data. In the current studies, each kindergarten and third grade class received a $50 gift for the students' participation. The junior high school received a $200 contribution to their general fund for the sixth graders' participation. Children were given this information if they asked. A report of the results of the study were provided to the children's instructors and principals with an oer to present and discuss the results with their classes.
Research has recently raised the possibility that a lack of anonymity may lead to increases in oer sizes. Homan et al. (1994) found that, in dictator games, anonymity increased the amount of money dictators claimed. Bolton and Zwick (1995) , however, report data showing that the eects of anonymity in ultimatum games are considerably less severe. In this study, the use of a face-to-face procedure may have boosted the size of the children's oers; this eect, however, is likely to be consistent across conditions. Given the need to insure that the children understood the procedures, more anonymous procedures were not feasible.
Dependent variables and analyses
The primary dependent variables for oerers were the value of their coin and M&M oers. For respondents, it was their lowest acceptable oers for coins and M&Ms. Oerers were also operationally de®ned as strategic, fair, or perfectly fair (Straub and Murnighan, 1995) . Oerers were de®ned as fair when they made identical oers in the complete and partial information conditions. Perfectly fair oers, in addition, were always 50±50. Strategic oerers shaded, oering less in the partial than in the complete information conditions. In the few cases when partial information oers exceeded complete information oers, they were classi®ed as fair.
The observed distributions of oers and responses in both information conditions did not satisfy the assumptions of normality or homogeneity of variance for ANOVA; the data also did not satisfy the sphericity assumptions of the mixed-model approach to within-subjects analyses. However, betweensubjects ANOVAs are robust with respect to departures from the normality and homogeneity assumptions (Maxwell and Delaney, 1990) . Moreover, the multivariate approach to within-subjects analyses does not require sphericity and is robust with respect to departures from normality. Therefore, all within-subjects analyses used the multivariate approach.
ANOVAs of M&M oers and lowest acceptable oers (responses) for coins and M&Ms included two between subjects factors, grades (kindergarten, third, and sixth) and gender (boys and girls), and two repeated factors, information (partial and complete) and amounts (4, 5, 10, and 11 for M&Ms). Since kindergartners did not understand the value of dierent coins, their responses were not included in a similar analysis of coin oers. Note that we use grades rather than age as a factor since grades (kindergarten, third, sixth) are quite distinct in our sample even though age may have varied somewhat within each grade.
We also present a series of qualitative observations. Finally, since consistency is one hallmark of rational behavior (Bazerman, 1994) , we measured the consistency of participants' behavior across and within their roles as oerers and respondents. In particular, correlations identi®ed: (1) whether children were consistent (generous or stingy) oerers for the two commodities (money and candy); (2) whether they consistently accepted (or rejected) the oers they received; and (3) whether their oers were related to their responses, i.e., they were willing to make and accept small (or large) oers.
Results
The results are presented in three stages: (1) order and experimenter eects; (2) overall analyses, tests of the hypotheses, and data on age-related bargaining behaviors and strategies; and (3) qualitative and correlational ®nd-ings. Non-signi®cant eects and results that are not pertinent to either the hypotheses or developmental processes are not reported but are available from the authors.
Tests of experimenter and order eects yielded only one signi®cant eect, indicating that third grade respondents in the face-to-face procedure had more moderate lowest acceptable coin oers [F(2,29) 4.44, p`0.05] for the second author (means of 4.5 and 6.2 cents for the partial and complete information conditions; n 25) than for the other two experimenters (means of 1.8 and 18.7 cents, respectively; n's 5 and 10). Given the large number of possible eects for experimenters (24 across the dierent conditions and dependent variables), odds were good that one would be signi®cant. Thus, we felt justi®ed in pooling the data over experimenters and order, especially since the largest of the experimenter conditions yielded the most moderate results.
Oers
Signi®cant eects for the third and sixth graders' monetary oers included grade [F(1,60) Frequency counts for the number of fair, perfectly fair, and strategic monetary oerers, however, indicated that girls were only slightly more often categorized as fair (n 17) than they were as strategic (n 14) and that third grade boys tended to be strategic (16 of 21) while sixth grade boys tended to be perfectly fair (15 of 23). Thus, the means and medians are slightly deceptive, and the conclusion that boys were generally strategic while girls were generally fair is more true, in this sample, for third than for sixth graders. It also suggests that when girls made strategic oers, they shaded their partial information oers less than boys did, and that sixth grade boys who did shade their oers shaded them a lot.
For M&M oers, the only signi®cant eect was a grade´gender´amount interaction [F(6,276) 2.81, p`0.02] which indicated that, while the median oer for oerers dividing 4 and 10 M&Ms was typically 2 and 5, respectively, girls tended to oer more than half (3 and 6) while boys oered less than half (2 and 5) when they were dividing 5 and 11 M&Ms.
Responses
The only signi®cant eect for responses to monetary ultimatums was a main eect for information [F(1,60) 17.73, p`0.001]. As in previous studies with adults, children were willing to take signi®cantly less (on average, 4.65 cents) when they did not know how much was being divided than when they did (10.65 cents). The analysis of children's responses to M&M oers yielded no signi®cant eects that were pertinent to the hypotheses.
Analysis of the frequency of acceptances of one penny and one M&M indicated that kindergartners accepted oers of one penny or one M&M more than third and sixth graders, [F(2,120) 3.70, p`0.03]: they accepted 67% of the one penny oers and 76% of the one M&M oers, compared to 27% and 27% for third graders and 40% and 62% for sixth graders, supporting Hypothesis 4. Overall, respondents accepted one M&M more frequently than one penny, [F(1,120) 9.95, p`0.005].
Qualitative and correlational results
There were three noteworthy qualitative ®ndings. Although many kindergartners did not understand the value of the dierent coins, they made a rough quantitative division of the coins when they were making oers. Many simply separated the pile of coins into two approximately equal groups and shoved one across the table as their oer. More importantly, approximately 12% of the kindergartners gave the other child all of the coins and all of the M&Ms. We did not see this behavior in any other group.
Second, more than half of the third graders who were dividing 4, 5, 10, and 11 M&Ms oered 2, 3, 5, and 6 (or some slight variation of this pattern) in both the complete and partial information conditions. When they were dividing 5 or 11 M&Ms, many asked whether they could cut one in half. As noted, girls were more likely to oer the odd M&M; boys were more likely to keep it.
In addition, when they responded to M&M oers from another child and they knew that 10 M&Ms were being divided (the complete information condition), 13 of the 40 third graders (35.5%; six boys and seven girls) rejected 1, 2, 3, and 4, accepted 5, and rejected 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. A lack of fairness, for them or for the other child, was the reason given for rejecting unequal oers.
We checked whether participants were consistent by converting oers and minimally acceptable oers (responses) to percentages of the amount oered, and calculating intercorrelations between and among their oers and their responses. Children were consistent respondents to M&M and monetary oers; their responses were highly correlated (3 of 4 coecients were signi®cant; 0.10 T r's T 0.49, p`0.05). They were also consistent offerers: correlations among monetary oers and among M&M oers were signi®cant in 28 of 29 instances; correlations between monetary and M&M oers led to 9 of 16 signi®cant correlations. No signi®cant correlations (out of 20) resulted, however, between responses and oers. Thus, children tended to be internally consistent as oerers or as respondents, but they were not consistent when they shifted from being respondents to oerers or vice versa.
Discussion
The data from Study 1 provide mixed support for the hypotheses. Hypothesis 5, that respondents would accept less when they did not know how much was being divided, was clearly supported for monetary oers. Thus, the current ®ndings were consistent with those for adults.
Hypothesis 4 suggested that younger children would accept smaller oers than older children. Kindergartners accepted oers of a single penny or M&M more often than the older children in this sample. But third graders' frequent use of a stringent criterion for fairness, which led to many rejections, runs counter to the hypothesis. Overall, support is mixed.
Hypothesis 3 was primarily supported: girls did tend to oer more than boys. They did so particularly when they divided an odd number of M&Ms (5 or 11) and when the respondent did not know how much money they were dividing (the partial information conditions), where, unlike the boys, they shaded their oers only slightly.
Hypothesis 2 suggested that older oerers would be increasingly strategic. Hypothesis 1 predicted that younger children would be perfectly fair more than older children; Hypothesis 1a suggested that younger children would not be as generous as older children. The data are not consistent for any of these hypotheses. Third graders shaded more than kindergartners. However, sixth graders were more often fair than strategic, supporting the notion that older oerers were more generous. But kindergartners were the only oerers to oer everything. Their intentions never seemed strategic; when they did not oer half, the size of their oer seemed to be based more on an inability to calculate what was exactly half than anything else.
Study 2
Study 1 investigated the bargaining behavior of young children in a simpli®ed, face-to-face procedure. Study 2 extends this research to older children, 6th and 9th graders who average 12 and 15 years of age, respectively, and compares their responses to young adults (college students) using standard response formats that increase participants' anonymity. Rather than responding one-on-one with an experimenter, respondents in Study 2 completed written questionnaires anonymously. By extending the age of the children we studied, we provide a more complete picture of the changes and development of bargaining behavior from younger children to adults.
Methods

Participants
Sixty additional students from the same sixth grade classes participated in this experiment, along with 58 students from three ninth grade classes from the high school in Urbana, Illinois, and 145 students from three undergraduate classes at the University of Illinois. Urbana is Champaign's sister city (they are not separated geographically) and has approximately 35,000 residents; the ninth graders represented a mix of racial and socioeconomic backgrounds. As noted, the sixth graders were primarily Caucasian from a mix of rural and suburban homes. The undergraduate population at the University of Illinois primarily draws middle and upper middle class students from the city of Chicago and the state of Illinois; the students in this study were enrolled in an introductory management class designed primarily for third year students (20 years of age, occasionally older).
Procedures
All participants responded to a paper-and-pencil questionnaire to ensure that their responses were comparable to those from previous research. The questionnaire asked them to ®rst act as ultimatum respondents and then as ultimatum oerers. (Some of the college students, as noted below, only acted as respondents, and none responded to or made ultimatums with M&Ms as prizes.) Sixth and ninth graders' questionnaires began with eight``no strings attached'' oers, where respondents were simply oered amounts of money (ranging from 1 cent to $5) that they could accept or reject. The instructions emphasized that their responses would not aect any other person. (Technically, of course, this cannot be true: any winnings had to come from somewhere. But we tried to diuse the source and, if asked, emphasized that no other individual provided these funds.) They were also asked the lowest amount they would accept in this and each of the following conditions. Thè`n o strings'' condition was included to determine just how low their smallest acceptable oers might go.
Participants then responded to oers, ®rst without knowing how much was being divided (partial information) and then when they did (complete information). Both sets of oers were in the same range as those from the no strings attached condition, but with slightly dierent values, to reduce suspicion. Oerers ostensibly divided 10 M&Ms and monetary amounts ranging from $1 to $1 million. Participants knew these amounts in the complete information condition. They also knew that amounts of $100 or more were strictly hypothetical; responses to or oers of amounts less than $100, however, were included in a lottery, described below, that determined their potential payos.
Participants then made their own ultimatum oers, ®rst when they knew that respondents did not know how much was being divided, and then when the amount was shared (complete) information. They divided 4, 5, 10, and 11 M&Ms and monetary amounts ranging from $1 to $1 million.
The college students responded to a similar series of questions. Two classrooms totalling 94 students responded to the no strings, partial, and complete information monetary oers but did not formulate oers. One other classroom of 51 college students participated in a dierent experiment and responded to and made all of the monetary oers but did not respond to no strings oers.
Dependent variables and analyses
The dependent variables and analyses were similar to those in Study 1. Comparisons across monetary amounts were obtained by analyzing the percentage oered. Monetary (raw and percentage) and M&M oers were included in separate four-factor ANOVAs, including two between subjects factors, grades (sixth, ninth, and college) and gender (females and males), and two repeated factors, information (partial and complete) and amounts (4, 5, 10, and 11 M&Ms; $1, $10, $30, $50, $100, $1000, and $1 million). Lowest acceptable oers (responses) were analyzed in two three-factor analyses, one including all three information conditions (no strings, partial, and complete) but restricted to the $10 amount, the other including only the complete information condition but including all of the amounts.
Incentives
As noted, the sixth graders' school received a contribution for their participation. In addition, three members from one college class won money depending on one of their responses to the oers. After completing many responses, three names were randomly chosen from the class roster and one of each of their responses to oers of $100 or less was also randomly chosen. That response determined their payo: if they accepted, they were paid the amount oered; if they rejected it, they received nothing.
The two classes that did not respond to the no strings oers each had two winners, one for their oers and responses and one for a set of utility questions that were part of another study (Straub and Murnighan, 1995) not reported here. In each case, the winners and one of their responses (of oers or responses of $100 or less) were randomly chosen. If they had accepted a particular amount, they received it. If they had rejected it, they received nothing. They knew this in advance. Although expected values for each response were quite low (given the low probability that any single response would be selected as a winner), awarded prizes ranged from a dime to $97.50. Bolle (1990) reports that such lottery procedures led to no dierences from other procedures that make smaller, direct payments to each respondent, suggesting that this payo scheme is reasonable and eective. After a post hoc questionnaire and the lottery, college students participated in a lengthy debrie®ng discussion, as did the ninth grade classes.
Results
Oers
The signi®cant eects from the ANOVAs for raw monetary oers and as a percentage of the amount divided are shown in Table 1 . Main eects indicated that sixth graders oered more (on average, 43% of the amount they were dividing) than ninth graders (37%) or college students (35%). Average oers were higher when there was complete information about the amount to be divided (43% versus 35% in the partial information conditions). Females made larger oers than males, but only for raw and not for percentage oers, due to the large amounts ($1 million) having a strong impact on the means, supporting Hypothesis 3. The eect for amount divided for raw oers was clearly a function of the manipulation. The more revealing eect was for the percentage of the amount divided, which showed that the oered percentage dropped as the amount increased. The means and medians from the grade´information interaction for percentage of the amount divided are shown in Table 2 . Oers dropped and strategic behavior (shading in the partial information conditions) increased as the age of the respondents increased (particularly for the medians), supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2 but not 1a.
The gender´information interaction for percentage oers indicates that, like the third and sixth graders in Study 1, males shaded their oers more than females. Across both gender and age groups, the median percentage oer in the complete information conditions was 50%; in partial information, females' median oer was 42.3% while males' was only 32.9%. As in Study 1, these data support Hypothesis 3 in the partial information conditions.
Frequencies of fair, perfectly fair, and strategic monetary oerers indicate that sixth grade girls were most often perfectly fair, as were sixth grade boys. Ninth grade and college females were split between being fair or perfectly fair and being strategic, and were more strategic as the amounts increased. Ninth Table 2 Monetary oers (in percentages of the amount divided) by sixth and ninth graders and college students in the information conditions grade and college males showed an inclination toward strategic oers, especially when the amounts were $10 or more. (The frequencies, for both studies, are shown in Table 3 .) These data also support Hypothesis 2. The information´amount and grade´amount interactions (see Tables 4  and 5) show that shading and the dierences between the grades increased as the amounts increased. The median oers indicate that oerers did not shade when they were oering one dollar, but they shaded about 10% for larger amounts and increased shading to 20% for oers dividing $1 million. Sixth graders' median oers (across both information conditions) were always half of the amount to be divided; older students' median oers for amounts greater than $1 were always less than half, with college students typically oering somewhat less than ninth graders. This is more support for Hypothesis 2.
Analysis of M&M oers for sixth and ninth grade children yielded signi®cant eects for information (F(1,113) 816.37, p`0.001) and information´amount (F(3,339) 10.76, p`0.001). The results indicate that complete information led to larger oers than in the partial information conditions, particularly with the larger amounts: oerers shaded M&Ms as well as money.
Responses
Analysis of responses to $10 ultimatum oers yielded eects for information (F(2,368) 48.98, p`0.001) and grade´information (F(4,368) 3.60, p`0.005). The interaction (see Table 6 ) indicates little dierence between the no strings and partial information conditions and a clear increase in lowest acceptable oers with complete information, as in previous studies. This supports Hypothesis 5. Sixth graders stated that they 59 T n T 60 56 T n T 58 n 49
were willing to accept less in the complete information condition than ninth graders and college students, supporting Hypothesis 4. Analysis of lowest acceptable oers across monetary amounts in complete information yielded signi®cant eects for grade (F(2,125) 15.18, p`0.001) and for grade´amount (F(2,244) 4.11, p`0.01). (See Table 7 , for means and medians.) As amounts increased, sixth graders required somewhat larger oers than ninth graders who required considerably more than college students, contrary to Hypothesis 4. Most college students showed a willingness to take very small oers, especially when the amounts were large (e.g., they accepted a median minimum oer of $100 when they knew that $1 million was being divided).
The analysis of responses to M&M oers yielded one eect, for information (F(1,16) 16.00, p`0.001). Sixth and ninth graders were willing to accept fewer M&Ms (M 1.80; median 1.00) when they did not know how many were being divided. They required more (M 2.40; median 2.00) when they knew that 10 M&Ms were being divided, supporting Hypothesis 5.
Fewer respondents accepted one penny in this study, compared to Study 1. Over both information conditions, sixth and ninth graders accepted one penny about 20% of the time; for college students, it was only 9%. For M&Ms, sixth graders accepted one 36% of the time and ninth graders accepted one 53% of the time. As with the younger children, one M&M was accepted more frequently than one penny for sixth and ninth graders (F(1,116) 44.75, p`0.001). Note: Oerers divided $10, but this was only known to respondents in the complete information condition.
Correlational analyses
As in Study 1, respondents were internally consistent: their responses to M&M and monetary oers were highly correlated; all 12 correlations were signi®cant (0.18`r`0.87, p`0.05). Correlations among and between monetary and M&M oers were also strong, with 227 of 253 signi®cant. Like the results for younger children, overall correlations between responses and oers were low, with only 22 of 106 signi®cant. For sixth and ninth graders, the correlations were not signi®cant (A0.21 T r T 0.29). But for college students, the relationships were all positive and tended to be signi®cant (0.33 T r T 0.44; n 140). Thus, the younger groups were not particularly consistent when they shifted from being respondents to oerers, but college students were.
Analysis of the sixth graders' responses and oers in the two studies yielded only one signi®cant eect: they required larger partial information oers on the questionnaires (Mean 18.2 cents) than they did when they responded one-on-one [Mean 5.81 cents; F(1,91) 6.92, p`0.01]. Although this dierence might raise concerns about the comparability of the procedures in the two studies, the fact that questionnaire respondents had seen larger amounts (i.e., questions asking them whether they would accept amounts up to $5 in the no strings condition) while face-to-face respondents were asked whether they would accept smaller oers in ascending order (1 cent, 2 cents, etc.) may have contributed to this dierence.
Discussion
The results from Study 2 provide a bridge from the ®ndings of Study 1 to previous research on adults. They help identify some of the developmental dierences in ultimatum bargaining between the two samples of dierent ages, particularly due to the strength of the results in Study 2.
Hypothesis 5 was strongly supported again (see Table 8 ), this time for both dollars and M&Ms. This suggests that the acceptance of small partial information oers is quite robust.
Hypothesis 4 led to outcomes that were dierent for money and M&Ms, and for partial and complete information. While sixth graders reported being willing to accept fewer M&Ms and less money in the $10 complete information condition than ninth graders or college students, they were less willing to accept small oers when higher amounts were being divided. These results raise issues concerning potentially dierent perceptions of these two commodities and of the dierent monetary amounts. Although the ®ndings Table 8 Evaluation of the hypotheses in the two studies match those of Study 1 qualitatively, the respondents in this study tended to accept one penny or one M&M less often than the younger respondents in Study 1. Thus, the results for Hypothesis 4 continue to be mixed. Hypothesis 3 found similar support in both studies. As before, sixth and ninth grade girls tended to oer more than boys, particularly in the partial information condition. Clearly, females take less strategic advantage of information asymmetries than males, across all ages studied here.
Hypothesis 2 was strongly supported for monetary oers: strategic behavior did increase with age. This was particularly true for college students whose behaviors as oerers and respondents were correlated. Since college students reported thinking that their peers were willing to accept small oers (as most of them were), then they could eectively oer them less, especially when respondents did not know how much was being oered. While third grade boys in Study 1 seemed to also grasp the possibility for strategic behavior, the increase in strategic behavior with age is particularly apparent in Study 2. It may be that the consistency that seems to come with age is necessary for this eect to fully appear.
With this older set of oerers, Hypothesis 1a received no support, while Hypothesis 1, which posited that younger children would make more equal oers, was strongly supported (again, only for dollars). Sixth graders, particularly sixth grade girls, were most likely to make 50±50 oers, and this tendency dissipated with age and increasing monetary amounts.
General discussion
The data from these two studies provide a ®rst step in the investigation of the development of bargaining behavior in ultimatum games. Starting with kindergartners, we observe a number of dierent behaviors, including their seeming inability to refuse oers of one M&M, their apparent generosity when making oers of coins or M&Ms, and no evidence of guile or strategic behavior whatsoever. Our youngest participants were the only ones to give all of the money or the candy away. This may have re¯ected altruism (e.g.,`b ecause he doesn't have much''); it may also represent a dierent script, since at least two children said that they gave everything to the other child`s o he wouldn't bother me.'' This ®ts the underlying notions of the model of justice by Damon (1980) (although his model predicted equal splits). At the same time, it provides a foundation for interpreting the behavior of the older children.
Third graders were particularly intriguing. They tended to be strategic oerers when they were dividing money but they were extremely fair when they were oering or responding to M&M oers. Boys and girls revealed dierent kinds of strategies as well, with boys being blatantly more strategic with monetary oers and girls being subtly more generous with M&M oers, oering more than half when they were dividing odd numbers of candies.
Sixth grade boys, in contrast, did not follow the trend established by third graders: few of their monetary oers were strategic (although these few were extremely strategic); instead most tended to be perfectly fair, making 50±50 oers. This represents a developmental discontinuity in the data: either the third grade boys in this sample were more strategic than might be expected or sixth grade boys were more generous. The data from Study 2 suggests that the former may be the more appropriate interpretation, since the format change from Study 1 to Study 2 led to almost no dierences in sixth graders' behavior. In fact, a relatively smooth trend across ages was quite strong in Study 2. Especially for the larger amounts of money, sixth graders indicated that oers needed to be larger to be acceptable, larger than those demanded by ninth graders or college students. At the same time, they oered more. Only the college students showed any tendency to be consistent across the two roles of oerer and respondent; they were also the only participants to express a willingness to accept very small oers.
Tests of the hypotheses indicated that, in general, younger children oered more and accepted less than older children or adults. Most kindergartners did not reject either one penny or one M&M. In addition, with increasing age, respondents other than college students appeared less willing to accept low oers. Girls were consistent across both studies, oering more than boys in the partial information conditions. They also tended to be fair or perfectly fair more often than males. When they did act strategically, they were only moderately strategic, shading their oers only slightly.
The acceptance of small oers by younger respondents, Hypothesis 4, received mixed support in both studies. Kindergartners accepted one penny and one M&M more than older children, and acceptances of one penny and one M&M tended to decrease with age (although third graders accepted less than expected). Sixth graders in Study 2 accepted less than older respondents in the complete information conditions when monetary amounts were small, but not when amounts were large. Thus, the data for acceptances may warrant additional investigation. (This is also true for adult populations as a whole.)
Respondents were quite consistent, however, in accepting smaller oers in the partial information conditions. When no information was available about the amount to be divided and respondents could not know how much oerers would bene®t, respondents tended to accept very small amounts. These ®ndings replicate previous ®ndings and show robust support for the subgame-perfect predictions for many age groups in partial information conditions.
The fact that our respondents tended to accept oers of one M&M more often than oers of one penny suggests that respondents evaluated them quite dierently. Their emotional reactions when the game switched to M&Ms were quite clear: they were much more physically active and smiled more when they knew that the currency had changed to M&Ms. Thus, future research might investigate whether immediately disposable, attractive commodities like M&Ms lead people to act as if anything is clearly better than nothing.
Limitations and future research
Since this study was not conducted longitudinally, the observed dierences may not re¯ect true developmental dierences. In addition, the payos may have been conceptualized dierently by the older and younger participants. Constraints by administrators and the risk of contaminating future respondents made it impossible to provide direct incentives to anyone except the college students. And, ®nally, we could not counter-balance the order of conditions (e.g., all coin oers preceded M&M oers in Study 1). This reduced the strength of the design but ensured that the participants attended directly to the task.
These limitations should lead to cautious conclusions. At the same time, the studies provide the ®rst data that we know of on these issues. As such, they provide the groundwork for additional research. In particular, the notion that third grade boys were obviously strategic (one asked the experimenter before making his oer,``Now, he doesn't know what this amount is, right?'') when they were dividing money warrants additional investigation. Whether this ®nding can be replicated, whether it might originate earlier (with ®rst or second graders, at ages 7 or 8), how it relates to other abilities (e.g., computational) or values, and why it appears for money and not M&Ms are all open questions. The more general question concerning the apparent inconsistencies across commodities also suggests the need for additional research ± especially since, unlike sixth graders, ninth graders ap-peared to be strategic for both their monetary and their M&M oers. Thus, the inconsistencies of sixth grade boys' monetary and M&M oers may reect one stage in a developing trend. Many third graders exercised the most stringent fairness criteria we observed in this study. Most made only 50±50 M&M oers, regardless of the information condition, and 13 of 40 third graders rejected oers that favored the other person and oers that favored themselves. They upheld an extreme standard for fairness even when oerers freely asked for less than they offered. This set of third graders more than supported the observations of Damon (1980) for 5-to 7-year-olds, i.e., tended to often no more and no less than 50±50 for both bargainers. At approximately 9 years of age, however, they were older than predicted by the model of Damon (1980) . Instead, they are in line with the early results of Handlon and Gross (1959) .
This result also suggests that strategic bargaining by young boys may be restricted to monetary negotiations. The qualitative dierences between money and M&Ms were highlighted by the fact that, for every age group, more respondents accepted oers of one M&M than oers of one penny, in both the complete and partial information conditions. (Of a total of 241 respondents, 98 (41%) accepted 1 penny in the partial information conditions; 134 (56%) accepted one M&M. For complete information, 62 (26%) accepted one cent; 104 (43%) accepted one M&M.)
The sixth and ninth graders' behaviors approximated but were less extreme than those of the college students in many ways. Sixth graders were less willing to accept low oers and both sixth and ninth graders made higher oers than college students. There were two other noteworthy dierences among the older groups. First, college students said that they were willing, on average, to accept extremely low oers as respondents; this more than oset the drop in their own oers as the amounts to be divided increased. And second, unlike all the younger participants, their oers and responses were signi®cantly correlated.
While the younger participants oered more and accepted less, the only adults in these studies, college students, oered less and accepted even less than the younger respondents. This shift, and the internally consistent oer and response behavior of the college students, suggests the possibility of a qualitative shift between ninth grade and college, at least in this sample. In particular, college students moved closer to matching the predictions of economic theory, oering less and accepting less, even with complete information. For them, reductions in oers were matched by reductions in what they were willing to accept. This suggests a distinct relaxation of the stringent fairness criteria exercised by younger children. With increasing age, people may be willing to accept much less than half, especially as the amount to be divided increases. And even these numbers may be in¯ated, since people's ability to reject large amounts of real money (e.g., sixth graders who said they would reject $300 or more when $1000 is being divided) is clearly open to question.
Alternative explanations for this apparent shift to consistency by college students include the possibility that they may be less aected by and less prone to quick emotional reactions. Recent research by Frank et al. (1993) also suggests another explanation: that college students have had the chance to study economics and, as a result, have become more consistent in their bargaining strategies: note in this context that the subjects in the present experiment were involved in a management class. These possibilities open doors for future research.
The results are also consistent with the notion that children become more competitive as they get older (e.g., Toda et al., 1978) . It may be that children's increasing competitiveness is fueled by a concomitant increase in strategic behavior, which allows them to achieve their competitive goals (i.e., to do better than the other person). Straub and Murnighan (1995) found that small amounts of money (e.g., less than a quarter or 50 cents) were almost meaningless to many respondents (since``they wouldn't work in a parking meter or a soda machine''). Some children also refused very small amounts of money (e.g., a penny or two). As one third grade boy, who rejected the oer of a penny, put it:``You can't buy anything with a penny. It's not going to do you a lot of good, unless you save up your pennies, which could take a very long time, because it takes 25 to equal a quarter.'' He rejected 2, 3, 4, and 5 cents as well, but accepted 10, saying``You can buy a piece of candy with 10 cents.'' Thus, even when people did reject small amounts of money, it may have been because they judged the amounts to be subjectively (rather than objectively) meaningless.
Economic models rarely address the behavior of children. But the continued support found here for Hypothesis 5 suggests that subgame-perfect predictions are also applicable in partial information conditions for very young respondents. As children get older, as they know how much is being divided, or if they are making rather than responding to ultimatum oers, however, they provide much less support for the subgame-perfect predictions.
Like adults, children rejected small, complete information oers and offered more than small amounts. This same third grade boy oered an ex-planation that has not been well incorporated in economic models. When he made a partial information oer dividing $1, he oered 50 cents and explained:``Then it would be 50±50. Both of us would have 50 cents.'' When he made a similar oer that was complete information, he said,``25 cents. No, 60 cents, because sometimes I like to give people some more than I got. Some I let them have all of it, and I just keep what I have. Sometimes money doesn't matter; it depends on what I feel.'' These quotes are included to show that, while children increasingly shape their behaviors to match those of adults, they start with a broad base of reactions, some economic and some concerning fairness. More research on how these two concerns develop and how they aect bargaining behavior and other interactions certainly seems warranted. We hope that the research reported here can provide some of the early groundwork for both theoretical and empirical advances in this area.
